

severe. If we can add anxiety regarding the military situation to anxiety as to food, we may bring her to terms. We are making her fight against her wishes, and that of itself justifies continued prosecution of the offensive.

On the other hand, if we, by our inaction, leave her free to win easy successes on fronts other than the Western, and allow her to proclaim to the world that we have failed, she will certainly keep both her people and her Allies together, and with these advantages and a harvest, the yield of which will be increased by the Roumanian crops, she will, in 1918, be in a military position which will allow her to regard calmly the arrival of a dozen or so American Divisions on the Western Front, even if shipping is available to send and maintain them.

7. My opinion is that the risks of waiting are too great, and that we must bring every possible pressure to bear on the French to make them fight. General Smuts in a paper just circulated to the War Cabinet supports this view. He says, speaking of the Western Front, * It is essential to our ends that we should keep the initiative and offensive, but both are enormously difficult in the situation in which we are placed on this front.

These impressions which I brought from the Front have since been reinforced by the rumour that several important members of the

French Government do not approve of General Nivelle's present offensive, and consider a defensive policy the wisest one for the French Army to pursue. If this policy is carried out and is applied also to the British Army, it means that towards the end of the third year of war the enemy has still succeeded